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Parodies are becoming increasingly popular to see in the world around us, from songs
to dog toys. With parodies comes the importance of determining whether they are
expressive works and thus protected by the First Amendment. Under the Rogers test
from the seminal Rogers v. Grimaldi decision came a test to evaluate the trademark’s
artistic relevancy in the allegedly infringing work that also is against explicitly
misleading uses of the trademark. Currently, there are three pronounced variations of
the Rogers test used amongst the federal circuits. This note argues that the Ninth
Circuit was correct in holding that the Bad Spaniels Silly Squeaker is an expressive
work under the Rogers test, thus offering it First Amendment protection. This note
place VIP Products v. Jack Daniels within the varying Rogers tests. Lastly, this note
argues that the framework outlined in VIP Products v. Jack Daniels allows similar
parodies to have the same First Amendment protection.
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A GOOD DAY TO BE A BAD SPANIEL: BROADENING THE
APPLICATION OF THE ROGERS TEST
MIKHAILA DUVALL
I.

INTRODUCTION

You walk into the store intending to purchase some Chardonnay when you
stumble upon what appears to be an alcohol section for man’s best friend adorned with
brands such as Pawtrón,1 White Paw2 and Wag-ernet3. Notwithstanding these
parodically named products, have you ever contemplated the intersection of trademark
law and the First Amendment? Jack Daniel’s certainly has.4
On March 31, 2020, Jack Daniel’s dog days ended when the Ninth Circuit ruled
in favor of VIP Products LLC (“VIP”). The court held that VIP’s dog toy parody
imitating Jack Daniel’s renowned Old. No. 7 bottle was an expressive work entitled to
First Amendment protection and did not infringe on Jack Daniel’s trademark rights. 5
VIP’s toy replaced Old. No. 7 with Old No. 2 to parody Jack Daniel’s famous bottle.6
The court determined that the “toy communicate[d] a ‘humorous message,’ using word
play to alter the serious phrase[s] that appear[ed] on a Jack Daniel’s bottle.”7
The case of VIP Products represents the Ninth Circuit expanding upon what
can be considered a vehicle for expression with respect to trademark rights. As the
Ninth Circuit highlighted, “[A] work need not be the expressive equal of Anna
Karenina or Citizen Kane” to be considered expressive;8 nor is a work “rendered nonexpressive simply because it is sold commercially.”9 In so holding, the court ruled that
Fido’s favorite toy is now an expressive work falling under the Roger’s test.10 The


© ORCID 0000-0002-7796-6394. Mikhaila Duvall, Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2023, UIC
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of the UIC School of Law Review of Intellectual Property Law editors and staff for their unwavering
dedication to the journal. I would like to dedicate this article to my parents, friends, and mentors –
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1 Chewy,
Pet Shop by Fringe Studio Pawtron Tequila Plush Dog Toy, CHEWY,
https://www.chewy.com/pet-shop-by-fringe-studio-pawtron/dp/332932 (last visited Sept. 22, 2021).
2 Haute
Diggity
Dog,
White
Paw
–
Bark
Cherry,
HAUTE
DIGGITY
DOG,
https://www.hautediggitydog.com/products/white-paw-hound-seltzer (last visited Sept. 22, 2021).
3 Vanderpump Pets, Vanderpup WAG-ERNET Sauvignon Wine Plush Toys, VANDERPUMP PETS ,
https://vanderpumppets.com/products/vanderpup-wag-ernet-sauvignon-wine-plush-toys (last visited
Sept. 22, 2021).
4 VIP Prods. LLC v. Jack Daniel's Props., 953 F.3d 1170, 1172 (9th Cir. 2020). Jack Daniel’s
argued that VIP’s “Bad Spaniel Silly Squeaker” violated their trademark Jack Daniel's Old No.7 Black
Label Tennessee Whiskey. Id. at 1172.
5 Id. at 1175–76.
6 Id. at 1172; see also Mydogtoy.com, Silly Squeakers Liquor Bad Spaniels Dog Toy,
MYDOGTOY.COM, https://mydogtoy.com/p/Silly-Squeaker-Liquor-Bottle-Bad-Spaniels
(last visited
Sept. 29, 2021) (providing a picture of the Bad Spaniel’s Silly Squeaker).
7 Id. at 1175 (quoting Gordon v. Drape Creative, Inc., 909 F.3d 257, 268–69 (9th Cir. 2018)).
8 Id.
9 VIP Prods. LLC, 953 F.3d at 1175.
10 Id.
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Rogers test applies to what are traditionally thought of as expressive works, like
books,11 video games,12 and songs.13 This decision signals that the Ninth Circuit is
taking a more expansive approach when considering what constitutes an expressive
work, and perhaps becoming a stray dog in doing so.14
Part II of this note analyzes the protection of expressive works under the First
Amendment as it applies to trademark law and the Rogers test’s multiple applications.
Part III takes an in-depth look at the case, VIP Products LLC v. Jack Daniel’s
Properties, Inc. Part IV evaluates the various Rogers test approaches, and places VIP
Products within this landscape, and it will be argued that had VIP Products been
decided under the likelihood of confusion test, the results would have been the same.
And, finally, Part V concludes that the court was correct in holding the “Bad Spaniels
Silly Squeaker” was an expressive work subject to the Rogers test as it did not infringe
on Jack Daniel’s trademark.15 This case note argues that the Ninth Circuit struck the
right balance between trademark rights and the public’s freedom of expression, and in
doing so opened the Rogers test to be applied to more avant-garde parodies.
II.

BACKGROUND

A. General Principles of Trademark Law
A trademark is a word, name, or symbol used to identify and distinguish goods
from those manufactured or sold by others.16 The usage of trademarks allows
11 Sugar Busters LLC v. Brennan, 177 F.3d 258, 269 (5th Cir. 1999) (stating that under unfair
competition laws, the rights in book titles are rightfully afforded protection).
12 Mil-Spec Monkey, Inc. v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1140 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
Video games merit First Amendment protection by communicating ideas through ever-advancing
technology. Id.
13 Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Rec., 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that MCA’s song, “Barbie
Girl,” poking fun at Mattel’s plastic dolls, was an expressive parody protected under the First
Amendment).
14 Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, An Intersystemic View of Intellectual Property and Free
Speech, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 41 (2013); see also David M. Kelly & Lynn M. Jordan, Twenty Years
of Rogers v. Grimaldi: Balancing the Lanham Act with the First Amendment Rights of Creators of
Artistic Works, 99 TRADEMARK REP. 1360, 1363 (2009) (stating that courts traditionally have been
reluctant to deviate from the likelihood-of-confusion analysis in the face of constitutional defenses).
15 VIP Prods. LLC, 953 F.3d at 1172. VIP’s usage of humorous messages on the Bad Spaniels Silly
Squeaker resulted in it being an expressive work. Id.
16 The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127(a) (2022). This section of the Lanham Act provides that a
civil action could be filed by:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or
any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which—
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to
the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial
activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s
goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any
person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
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companies to effectively distinguish themselves in the marketplace and stream of
commerce.17 Utilizing a mark builds goodwill and brand recognition.18 This, in turn,
aids consumers identifying their preferred goods or services in the marketplace.19
The foundation for United States trademark law was established by the
Lanham Act (“Act”), which defines federal trademark protection and outlines
trademark registration rules.20 The Act provides for a national system of trademark
registration by protecting the owner of a federally registered mark.21 The mark is
protected against the use of similar marks if the use would likely create consumer
confusion, or if the dilution of a famous mark is likely to occur. 22
For a mark to be trademark eligible, two basic requirements must be met.
First, an entity must use the mark in commerce, or register the mark with a bona fide
intent to use the mark as a designation of source for its goods.23 Second, the mark must
be distinctive.24 Distinctiveness addresses a trademark’s capacity to be identify and
distinguish an entity’s goods from others.25
For trade dress to be protected, the individual asserting trade dress protection
carries the burden of proof that the product is not functional.26
A feature will be considered functional and will not serve as a trademark if the
feature is “essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality
of the article.”27 In order for a mark to be distinctive, the product with the marks must
be distinguishable from the products of others. 28 Additionally, designation of origin
allows for the mark be an identifiable source of a seller’s goods and distinguish that
source from other sources.29 If the designation does this, it will be considered
distinctive.30

Top Tobacco, L.P. v. N. Atl. Operating Co., 509 F.3d 380, 381 (7th Cir. 2007).
Premier Dental Prods. Co. v. Darby Dental Supply Co., 794 F.2d 850, 853 (3d Cir. 1986). The
Third Circuit stated that “[a] trademark symbolizes the public’s confidence or ‘goodwill’ in a particular
product.” Id.
19 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2.15 (5th
ed. 2022) (“A trademark has no existence separate from the good will of the product or service it
symbolizes. Good will and its tangible symbol, a trademark, are inseparable. Therefore, a trademark
cannot be sold or assigned to another unless the associated goodwill is also sold.”).
20 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2022).
21 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2022).
22 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(a), 1125(c) (2022).
23 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2022).
24 Id.
25 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 4:13 (5th
ed. 2022).
26 Traffix Devices v. Mktg Displays, 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001).
27 Id. at 33.
28 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2022).
29 Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 863 (1982).
30 Id.
17
18
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Sections 32(1)(a)-(b)31 and 43(a)32 of the Lanham Act33 allow a trademark
owner to bring a civil claim against an alleged infringer whose product may likely
confuse or deceive consumers regarding the association, origin, or sponsorship of the
product.34 To state a trademark infringement claim, a plaintiff must prove three basic
elements: 1) distinctiveness; 2) nonfunctionality; and 3) likelihood of confusion. 35
However, these elements can be articulated by courts in a variety of ways.36 To be
protected under § 2 of the Lanham Act, the mark must distinguish the applicants goods

31 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a)(b) (2022). This section of Lanham Act provides that a civil
action could be filed by:
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant—
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, . . . copy, or colorable imitation of a
registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or
advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely
to cause confusion, or
to
cause mistake,
or
to deceive; or
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark and apply
such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints,
packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce
upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of
goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil action by the
registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided. Under subsection (b) hereof, the
registrant shall not be entitled to recover profits or damages unless the acts have
been committed with knowledge that such imitation is intended to be used to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.
32 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2022). This section of the Lanham Act provides that a civil action could be
filed by:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or
any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which—
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to
the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial
activities by another person[.]
33 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 27:14 (5th
ed. 2022). The Lanham Act permits a trademark infringement claim to either be brought for a
registered trademark under 15 U.S.C. § 1114 or unregistered trademarks under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
Id.
34 Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 445 (6th Cir. 2003).
35 Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd., v. E&J Gallo Winery, 150 F.3d 1042, 1046–47 (9th Cir. 1998).
36 See Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1144 (9th Cir.
2011) (“[A] party must prove: (1) that it has a protectible ownership interest in the mark; and (2) that
the defendant’s use of the mark is likely to cause consumer confusion.”); Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google,
Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 152 (4th Cir. 2012):

[A] plaintiff must prove: (1) that it owns a valid mark; (2) that the defendant used
the mark ‘in commerce’ and without plaintiff’s authorization; (3) that the defendant
used the mark (or an imitation of it) “in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
distribution, or advertising” of goods or services; and (4) that the defendant’s use of
the mark is likely to confuse consumers.
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from those of another.37 The last element, likelihood of confusion, is the most important
element.38 Evidence of likelihood of confusion amongst consumers is convincing
evidence that future confusion is likely.39
B. Protection of Expressive Works Under the First Amendment
The First Amendment of the Constitution states “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”40 The First Amendment can
be an affirmative defense when an expressive work has allegedly infringed a
trademark.41
A parody is a common form of an expressive work that is a “distorted imitation
of a person, group, practice or other idea, that is intended to mock the person or thing
imitated.”42 A parody must convey two “simultaneous–and contradictory–messages.43
To not violate trademark law, the parody needs to convey that it is the original, but at
the same is not the original, and rather is a parody.44
In determining whether a work is expressive, courts analyze whether the work
is “communicating ideas or expressive points of view.”45 A work will not be rendered
non-expressive because it is commercially sold.46 For example, in Louis Vuitton SA v.
Haute Diggity Dog LLC, the Fourth Circuit ruled that Chewy Vuiton, a dog toy brand
parodying Louis Vuitton’s trade dress did not infringe on Louis Vuitton’s trademark.47
37 15 U.S.C § 1052 (2022). This section of the Lanham Act provides background on trademarks
registerable on the principal register.
38 In AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979), the Ninth Circuit said:

In determining whether confusion between related goods is likely, the
following factors are relevant: 1. strength of the mark; 2. proximity of the goods; 3.
similarity of the marks; 4. evidence of actual confusion; 5. marketing channels used;
6. type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; 7.
defendant's intent in selecting the mark; and 8. likelihood of expansion of the
product lines.
Id. at 348–49.
39 Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 845 (9th Cir. 1987).
40 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
41 Univ. of Ala. Bd. Of Trs. v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1281 (11th Cir. 2012) (discussing
how the Defendant was permitted to raise First Amendment affirmative defense in relation to the
University football player’s images he had taken and used to create forms of artistic expression).
42 Parody, THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (Desk ed. 2012); Campbell v. AcuffRose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994) (“[At] the heart of a parodist’s claim . . . is the use of some
elements of a prior author’s composition to create a new one that . . . comments on the author’s work.”).
43 World Wrestling Fed’n. Ent., Inc. v. Big Dog Holdings, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 413, 431 (W.D. Pa.
2003).
44 Nike, Inc. v. Just Did It Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1228 (7th Cir. 1993).
45 L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publrs. Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 1987) (denying parodists the
opportunity to poke fun at things that are woven into the fabric of daily life “constitutes a serious
curtailment of a protected form of expression.”). Id. at 34.
46 Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Rec., 296 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2002).
47 Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 269–70 (4th Cir. 2007)
(“Haute Diggity Dog's ‘Chewy Vuiton’ dog toys . . . loosely resemble miniature handbags and . . . evoke
LVM handbags . . . .[I]n lieu of the LV mark, [the dog toy] uses "CV"; and the other symbols and colors
employed are imitations, but not exact ones, of those used in the LVM Multicolor and Cherry
designs.”). Id. at 258.
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In doing so, the court utilized the likelihood of confusion test.48 The Fourth Circuit
stated that the association between Haute Diggity Dog’s (“HDD”) marks and Louis
Vuitton’s marks are not likely to impair the distinctiveness of Louis Vuitton’s marks.49
It was evident that HDD created an association between its marks and Louis Vuitton’s
marks, but HDD made it clear that there was no actual association between the marks
because of the parody’s operation and effect. 50
C. The Rogers Test and its Three Variations
Rogers v. Grimaldi was an influential case from the Second Circuit in 1989
that created the Rogers test for expressive works.51 In Rogers, the plaintiff, Ginger
Rogers brought claims under the Lanham Act against Grimaldi, an Italian producer,
for creating a movie entitled “Ginger and Fred.”52 The movie centered around two
cabaret dancers who became famous in Italy for imitating Ginger Rogers and Fred
Astaire.53 Given the fact that Rogers and Astaire were world-renowned at the time of
the movie’s creations, Rogers claimed the movie title would mislead consumers to
believe she either sponsored or endorsed it.54 The district court ruled in favor of
Grimaldi, finding the title was an artistic expression deserving full First Amendment
protection.55 The Second Circuit created the Rogers test after finding the district
court’s decision “unduly narrow[ed] the scope of the act” by “creat[ing] a nearly
absolute privilege.”56
The Rogers test established a two-prong test for cases of alleged trademark
infringement by an artistic work under the Lanham Act. The test looks to whether the
“public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public interest in free
expression.”57 The Rogers test will apply if: 1) the “title has no artistic relevance to the
underlying work whatsoever”; or 2) “the title explicitly misleads as to the source or
content of the work.”58 The Second Circuit even mentioned when a title explicitly
misleads consumers, even in a minimally artistic capacity, will not receive First
Amendment protection.59

Id. at 266.
Id. at 267.
50 Id. at 268.
51 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989).
52 Id. at 996.
53 Id. at 996–97.
54 Id. at 997 (“In opposition to the motion, Rogers submitted a market research survey purporting
to establish that the title "Ginger and Fred" misled potential movie viewers as to Rogers' connection
with the film.”). Id.
55 Id. (discussing that because the speech at issue was not primarily intended to serve a
commercial purpose, the Lanham Act prohibitions do not apply).
56 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 997.
57 Id. at 999. There will be no application of the Rogers test if the title has “no artistic relevance
to the underlying work whatsoever.” Id.
58 Id. The court in this case explained that a misleading title with no artistic relevance cannot be
sufficiently justified by a free expression of interest. Id.
59 Id. at 1000. The court described its new test as one that “insulates from restriction titles with
at least minimal artistic relevance that are ambiguous or only implicitly misleading but leaves
vulnerable to claims of deception titles that are explicitly misleading as to source or content . . . .” Id.
48
49
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The Second Circuit applied the two-prong test and found “Ginger and Fred” to
be a relevant aspect of the movie’s underlying plot, and since Rogers never explicitly
endorsed the movie, the court ruled in the defendant’s favor.60 The movie title as
artistically relevant to the work given the juxtaposition that Grimaldi was seeking to
expose.61 To the extent that there was a risk of confusion as to what the work was
about, that risk was outweighed by the danger that suppressing the artistically
relevant yet ambiguous title would overly restrict expression.62
In the years since the creation of the Rogers test, it has been used to cover a
wider range of trademarks than when it was first implemented.63 With that, the courts
have been flexible with the Rogers test “has yet to find its bearings” in the wider
application of its use.64 This expansion has resulted in three pivotal Rogers test
variations gaining traction amongst the circuit courts. 65 Determining which of the
variations applies turns on the amount of First Amendment protection that each
circuit affords to the defendant.
Out of the Rogers test variations applied across the courts arose three distinct
applications of the Rogers test, each offering varying levels of protection to speech. 66
Rogers I “more or less automatically protects expressive works” with the plaintiff
needing to be able to demonstrate that the defendant made an “‘explicit indication,’
‘overt claim,’ or ‘explicit misstatement.’”67 For courts to offer protection under the First
Amendment, the title of the work must explicitly mislead as to the “source or the
content of the work.”68 There must be evidence relating to the behavior of the
identifying material’s user, not the impact of the use.69
In Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc., Electric Arts (“EA”) used Jim Brown, one of
the most recognizable football players of all time, in several versions of the Madden

60 Id. at 1004. Movie titles may not utilize a celebrity’s name unless the title is “wholly unrelated”
to the movie or was “ . . . a disguised commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or services.” Id.
61 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1000.
62 Id. at 1001.
63 Thomas M. Byron, Spelling Confusion: Implications of the Ninth Circuit's View of the
"Explicitly Misleading" Prong of the Rogers Test, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 9 (2011).
64 Id.
65 See VIRAG, S.R.L. v. Sony Comput. Entm’t. Am. LLC, 699 F. App'x 667, 668 (9th Cir. 2017)
(The Ninth Circuit utilized Rogers I where it held that Sony’s usage of VRAG’s mark did not constitute
a violation under the Lanham Act); see Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 778
(8th Cir. 1994) (The Eighth Circuit used Rogers II when ruling that Balducci’s parody of AnheuserBusch’s Michelob beer was not protected under the First Amendment); see Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v.
ComicMix LLC, 983 F.3d 443, 463 (9th Cir. 2020) (The Ninth Circuit used Rogers III where it held
that ComicMix’s usage of Dr. Seuss’ marks in its book did not explicitly mislead as to its source).
66 William K. Ford, Restoring Rogers: Video Games, False Association Claims, and the ‘Explicitly
Misleading’ Use of Trademarks, 16 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 306, 310 (2017). “Rogers comes
in three versions, which [are] refer[red] to as Rogers I, Rogers II, and Rogers III.” Id.
67 Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1245 (9th Cir. 2013) (stating that when First
Amendment rights are of utmost importance, the Rogers test will apply).
68 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating how the Lanham Act should apply
to artistic works only when the public interest in free expression is outweighed by avoiding consumer
confusion as to a misleading product).
69 Elec. Arts, 724 F.3d at 1246. The Ninth Circuit held that Brown was unable to provide evidence
of EA utilizing statements from Brown to mislead consumers into thinking he sponsored or endorsed
the video game.
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NFL video games, but Brown never gave permission for his image to be used by EA. 70
The Ninth Circuit held that EA’s video game was an expressive work protected under
the First Amendment and there were no facts demonstrating EA explicitly misled
consumers by using Jim Brown’s image.71 Moreover, there was no “explicit indication,
overt claim, or explicit misstatement” as to the usage of Brown’s likeness that would
confuse consumers.72
Rogers II can afford the defendant moderate protection under the First
Amendment.73 The Second Circuit clarified that the Rogers test is applicable when
“expression, and not commercial exploitation of another's trademark, is the primary
intent.”74 A plaintiff must make a “particularly compelling” showing of a likelihood of
confusion to overcome the Rogers defense.75 The question then becomes whether the
title is misleading in a manner that induces the public to believe the product was
otherwise authorized by the plaintiff.76 The determination of likelihood of confusion
must be compelling in a manner that outweighs First Amendment interests. 77
In Twin Peaks Productions, Inc.. v. Publications International, Ltd.,
defendants created a detailed book based on the first eight episodes of television show
Twin Peaks.78 In the book, defendant noted that it was not associated with Twin Peaks
or their affiliates.79 The Second Circuit held that the book infringed on Twin Peak’s
fictional work, thus constituting a synopsis that served no legitimate purpose and
negatively impacted Twin Peak’s potential market for a similar product.80
Rogers III affords plaintiffs “no special protection” under the First
Amendment.81 The plaintiff merely needs to show a likelihood of confusion to overcome
70 Id. at 1240. The Madden NFL series allows game users to control avatars that represent
professional football players in simulated football games. Id.
71 Id. at 1246. The court elaborated that under Rogers I, § 43(a) of the Lanham Act will not be
applied to expressive works unless the use of trademark or other identifying material explicitly
misleads as to the source or the content of the work. Id.
72 Id. at 1245 (quoting Rogers, 875 F.3d at 1001).
73 See Cliff Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Pub. Group, 886 F.2d 490, 493–95 (2d Cir. 1989).
Under this approach, the court first considers the likelihood of confusion factors before balancing the
extent of the confusion with the First Amendment. Id. at 495.
74 Id. at 495.
75 Simon & Schuster v. Dove Audio, 936 F. Supp. 156, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (arguing that the
likelihood of confusion must be particularly compelling to outweigh the First Amendment interest
established in Rogers).
76 Twin Peaks Prods. v. Publ’n Int’l., Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that the
question turns on whether the title product is misleading in the sense that it induces the public to
believe the product was prepared or authorized by the trademark owner).
77 Id. at 1379.
78 Id. at 1370.
79 Id. at 1379 (explaining that literary titles do not violate the Lanham act unless the title has no
artistic relevance to the underlying work or the artistic relevance is used in a way to explicitly mislead
as to the source of the work.); see also American Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., 35 F. Supp.
2d 727, 735 (D. Minn. 1998) (holding that New Line’s documentary “Dairy Queens” documentary title
would likely cause consumer confusion. Dairy Queen’s strong, distinctive, and recognizable mark
meant the documentary title would likely cause consumer confusion. The balance between the public’s
interest in avoiding consumer confusion and trademark dilution outweighed New Line’s First
Amendment interests).
80 Id. at 1378 (concluding that “a substantial number of . . . purchasers, on seeing the name Twin
Peaks as part of the title of the Book, would . . . believe that plaintiff was the source of the goods.”).
81 Ford, supra note 66, at 310.
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the Rogers defense.82 When applying the second prong of the Rogers test, the relevant
question becomes whether the product would confuse the public into thinking that the
plaintiff was involved in the creation of the defendant’s product or sponsored the
product.83 The court’s utilizing this Rogers test variation have rendered it nothing but
another likelihood of confusion test.
In E.S.S. Entertainment 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., Rock Star created
the video game, Grand Theft Auto that mimicked parts of California, including ESS’s
club.84 Rockstar utilized a logo similar to the defendant’s logo and changed it from “the
Play Pen” to “the Pig Pen” without obtaining authorization from the defendants. 85 The
court held that the modification of ESS’s label was not explicitly misleading, and thus
protected under the First Amendment.86 In its holding, the court stated that the game
is not about E.S.S.’s club and that the club is not recognizable enough to constitute a
Lanham Act violation.87
III.

VIP PRODUCTS LLC V. JACK DANIEL’S PROPERTIES, INC. (2020)
A. Facts of VIP Products

VIP designed and sold “Silly Squeaker” dog toys that resembled various bottles
of familiar beverages, but with dog-related changes.88 In 2013, VIP sold the “Bad
Spaniels Silly Squeaker”, which attempted to humorize a Jack Daniel’s Old No. 7 Black
Label Tennessee Whiskey bottle.89 The toy has multiple humorous pooch parodies. For
instance, “43% POO BY VOL. 100% SMELLY”90 replaces “40% Alc. by Vol. (80
Proof).”91 A tag attached to the dog toy states the “product is not affiliated with Jack
Daniel Distillery.”92 In 2014, Jack Daniel’s demanded that VIP cease selling the “Bad

E.S.S. Ent. 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2008).
Id. (stating that the mere use of a trademark alone cannot suffice to make its use explicitly
misleading).
84 Id. at 1096. The Lead Map Artist stated he “did not seek to re-create a realistic Los Angeles;
rather he created ‘Los Santos,’ a functional city that parodied the . . . places of Los Angeles.” Id.
85 Id. at 1097.
86 Id. at 1101. There is nothing to indicate that “the buying public [Grand Theft players] would
reasonably have believed that E.S.S. produced the video game, or for that matter Rock Star operated
a strip club.” Id. at 1100.
87 E.S.S. Ent. 2000, Inc., 547 F.3d at 1100-01. “A reasonable consumer would not think a company
that owns one strip club in East Los Angeles, which is not well known to the public at large, also
produces a technologically sophisticated video game like San Andreas.” Id.
88 VIP Prods. LLC v. Jack Daniel's Props., 953 F.3d 1170, 1172 (9th Cir. 2020). Silly Squeaker
resembles a Mountain Dew bottle but is labeled “Mountain Drool.” Id.
89 Id. VIP’s goal in creating the Silly Squeaker was to “reflect on the humanization of the dog in
our lives,” and to comment on “corporations [that] take themselves very seriously.” Id.
90 Id. Another notable difference includes “the Old No. 2, on your Tennessee Carpet” as opposed
to “Old No. 7 Brand Tennessee Sour Mash Whiskey.” Id.
91 Jack Daniel’s, Make it Count, JACK DANIELS, https://www.jackdaniels.com/en-us/whiskey/oldno-7 (last visited Sept. 20, 2021) (stating that Jack Daniel’s Tennessee Whisky has borne the JACK
DANIEL’S and OLD NO. 7 trademarks since its creation in 1875, except for during prohibition).
92 VIP Prods. LLC, 953 F.3d at 1172.
82
83
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Spaniels Silly Squeaker” and alleged that the toy infringed on their trademark rights,
trade dress, and bottle design.93
B. Procedural History
Between October 2, 2017, and October 6, 2017, the District Court of Arizona
held a bench trial to decide whether VIP had violated Jack Daniel’s trademark, trade
dress, and bottle design in a manner that would cause confusion amongst consumers. 94
After trial, the court granted Jack Daniel’s motion for summary judgement, finding
VIP violated Jack Daniel’s trademark and trade dress in a manner that did not entitle
them to the First Amendment defense.95
The district court rejected VIP’s fair use defense because under the Sleekcraft
likelihood of confusion factors, there was a likelihood of confusion. 96 Jack Daniel’s
survey established that 29% of tested consumers thought Jack Daniel’s either put out
the toy or authorized the toy, thus demonstrating actual confusion.97 Additionally, the
court stated that VIP’s disclaimer on its packaging was not sufficient to disprove
similarity.98 Lastly, because Jack Daniel’s whiskey sales exceeded seventy-five million
bottles between 1997 and 2015, the strength of their mark being used on
noncompetitive products would cause confusion. 99 Because of this, the district court
ordered VIP to cease production of the Bad Spaniels toy so as not to cause continued
confusion amongst consumers.100
C. The Holding of the Court
The Ninth Circuit vacated the judgment after trial on the issue of infringement
and remanded for further proceedings while vacating the permanent injunction
against VIP.101 The permanent injunction, entered by the district court, prohibited VIP
from continuing to sell the Bad Spaniels toy.102

Id. VIP responded to the demand by bringing a declaratory judgment against Jack Daniel’s. Id.
VIP Prods. LLC v. Jack Daniel's Props., 291 F. Supp. 3d 891, 897 (D. Ariz. 2018).
95 Id. at 899 (reasoning that because were valid and famous before the Bad Spaniel’s toy was
created and sold that the accused use is likely to cause negative associations that harms Jack Daniel’s
reputation).
96 Id. at 899 (holding that Jack Daniel’s trade dress and bottle design are distinctive, not generic,
and are nonfunctional).
97 Id. at 908 (stating that Jack Daniel’s survey result that 29% of potential consumers would be
confused is nearly double the threshold to show infringement).
98 Id. at 909. “Various retailers that sell Jack Daniel's licensed merchandise also sell VIP's “Bad
Spaniels” product including Walmart, Amazon.com, and “Boozingear.com” sold both Jack Daniel’s and
the Bad Spaniel’s toy.” Id.
99 VIP Prods. LLC, 291 F. Supp. 3d at 909 (noting that Jack Daniel’s internal records show
consumer awareness of the Jack Daniel’s brand to be around 98%).
100 Id. at 911. The district court based its reasoning to order VIP to cease selling the Bad Spaniel’s
toy on the “strong possibility” that VIP may expand into the alcohol industry. Id.
101 VIP Prods. LLC v. Jack Daniel's Props., 953 F.3d 1170, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2020) (directing the
district court to apply the Rogers test after determining that Bad Spaniels is an expressive work
afforded First Amendment protection).
102 VIP Prods. LLC v. Jack Daniel's Props., No. CV-14-02057-PHX-SMM, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
232410, at *6 (D. Ariz. Oct. 8, 2021).
93
94
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Regarding the issue of aesthetic functionality and distinctiveness, the court
maintained that, despite many individual elements of Jack Daniel’s being used by
other whiskey companies, the combination of bottle and label elements are
nonfunctional and distinctive.103 Because of this, VIP was able to use Jack Daniel’s
bottle and label elements on their toy.104
The court based its rationale for affirming the rejection of VIP’s request for
cancellation of Jack Daniel’s registered mark on the basis that the bottle design is
distinctive and nonfunctional.105 The evidence VIP presented failed to demonstrate
that the elements, when taken together, were functional or distinctive.106
Regarding VIP’s First Amendment protections, the court stated the likelihood
of confusion test was improper because artistic expression was at issue.107 The
likelihood of confusion test fails to consider the full weight of the public’s interest in
free expression.108
The Ninth Circuit determined that the toy communicated a “humorous
message” through its word play that altered the serious phrasing on Jack Daniel’s
bottles, thus qualifying as an expressive work.109 Bad Spaniels made an effort to create
a transformative work with “new expression, meaning or message.” 110 The fact that
VIP chose to poke fun at the seriousness that Jack Daniel’s tried to present is
irrelevant.111
Concerning the infringement claim, the court strayed from using the likelihood
of confusion test.112 Rather, the court signaled to the district court that on remand, it
should apply the Rogers test because VIP is able to establish at least one of the two
prongs.113 The Ninth Circuit laid the ground work for the district court to apply the

VIP Prods. LLC, 953 F.3d at 1173–74.
Id.
105 Id. (stating that plaintiff in an infringement case regarding a registered trademark is given
the presumptive advantage on the issue of validity, thus shifting the burden to the defendant).
106 Id. at 1174.
107 Id. (quoting Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Rec., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002)) (explaining that
Mattel, Inc. extended the Rogers test beyond a title).
108 VIP Prods. LLC, 953 F.3d at 1174.
109 Id. at 1175 (quoting Gordon v. Drape Creative, Inc., 909 F.3d 257, 268–69 (9th Cir. 2018)).
In Gordon, the Ninth Circuit determined that greeting cards which combined the trademarked
phrases “Honey Badger Don’t Care” and “Honey Badger Don’t Give s - - -” with event announcements
such as Halloween or a birthday were expressive works entitled to First Amendment protection. The
greeting cards used the juxtaposition of an event with honey badger’s aggressive assertion of apathy
to convey a humorous message.
110 Id. at 1175 (quoting Dr. Suess Enter. L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1401
(9th Cir. 1997)) (holding that Penguin’s usage of Dr. Suess’ trademarks and copyrights infringed upon
the trademarks and copyrights, thus violating the Lanham Act).
111 Id.
112 Id. at 1174 (explaining that likelihood of confusion test seeks to strike a balance between the
First Amendment and trademark rights and requires the plaintiff have a valid, protectable trademark
and defendant’s use of the mark is likely to cause confusion).
113 VIP Prods. LLC, 953 F.3d at 1174 (stating that the Lanham Act will only apply to expressive
works if the plaintiff is able to establish one of two prongs of the Rogers test).
103
104
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Rogers test by determining Bad Spaniels was an expressive work that conveyed a
humorous message by commenting on the elements Jack Daniel’s tried to enforce.114
Because VIP used Jack Daniel’s trade dress and bottle design to convey a
humorous message, they were protected under the First Amendment and did not dilute
Jack Daniel’s trademark.115 In reversing the district court, the Ninth Circuit
determined the use of the mark was “noncommercial” because it contained a “protected
expression.”116 Thus, the usage of various Jack Daniel’s marks was noncommercial,
even though it was used to sell a dog toy.117
IV.

ANALYSIS

The three prevalent Rogers tests adaptation will be expanded upon to figure
out which of the variations the Ninth Circuit used. In doing so, VIP Products will be
placed within the structure of these variations. In addition, this section will compare
Haute Diggity Dog and the likelihood of confusion test used therein with VIP Products
to demonstrate that the Ninth Circuit reached the same conclusion whilst using the
Rogers test. Lastly, arguably, this case will pave the way for more unconventional
parodies to be considered expressive works, like prayer candles.
A. Expanding on the Three Rogers Tests Variations
Under Rogers I, an artistic work may be “explicitly misleading” in either an
implicit or explicit manner.118 An expressive work will implicitly mislead the public
when the title of the work includes “a well-known name without any overt indication
of authorship or endorsement.”119 An implicitly misleading use of a trademark
constitutes a protectable expression outside the Lanham Act’s purview.120 On the
explicitly misleading side of the dichotomy, the Second Circuit in Rogers centered on a
trademark’s use containing clear misrepresentations as to the source of the work or

114 Id. at 1175; see also Gordon v. Drape Creative, Inc., 909 F.3d 257, 268–69 (9th Cir. 2018)
(holding that greeting cards combining trademarked phrase “Honey Badger Don’t Care” alongside an
event such as Halloween were protected under the First Amendment because the cards conveyed a
humorous message).
115 Id. at 1176.
116 Id. Speech is considered noncommercial “if it does more than propose a commercial transaction
and contains some protected expression and contains some protected expression.” Id.
117 Id.
118 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989); see also Byron, supra note 63, at 10.
(“When formulating the ‘explicitly misleading’ prong of the [Rogers] test, the Second Circuit operated
under the premise that the title of an artistic works could be misleading in either an implicit or explicit
manner.”). Id.
119 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999. For example, “the hit song ‘Bette Davis Eyes,’ and the . . . film ‘Come
Back to the Five and Dime, Jimmy Dean, Jimmy Dean’” may implicitly suggest the celebrity endorsed
the work or helped produce. Even if that suggestion is false, the title is artistically relevant to the
work. Id. at 999–1000.
120 Dana Kramer, Honey Badger Does Care About First Amendment Protections in Trademark
Law, 84 MO. L. REV. 873, 883–84 (2019); see Univ. of Ala. Bd. Of Trs. v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d
1266, 1277 (11th Cir. 2012).
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the works endorsement.121 Under this logic, only when a trademark’s use in an
expressive work falls on the explicit side of the dichotomy will the Lanham Act
preclude the usage of the trademark and protect the trademark owner.122
Regarding Rogers II, the Second Circuit, sensitive to the limitation on the
“explicitly misleading” prong, developed its own variation of the Rogers test.123 In doing
so, the Second Circuit adopted the two prong Rogers test in cases like Cliff Notes, Inc.
v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group and Twin Peaks for third party marks
that are pivotal to an expressive work.124
In Twin Peaks, the court determined that a plaintiff must make a “particularly
compelling” showing of confusion to overcome First Amendment concerns. 125 However,
the Second Circuit did not expand upon what counts as “particularly compelling,”
resulting in Rogers II calling for vague balancing of interests that tend to weigh in
favor of the media defendant. 126 In Cliff Notes, the Second Circuit held that a slight
risk of consumer confusion is outweighed by public interest in free expression,
especially when expression must, to some extent, resemble the original.127
Under Rogers III, the Ninth Circuit may be the stray dog regarding its
interpretation of the Rogers test.128 There must be balance between a creators First

121 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1007 (proposing a hypothetical where the characters, “Ginger and Fred”
published memoirs under the title ‘The True Life Story of Ginger and Fred’ and the film-maker used
the fictitious book title as the film title, the Lanham Act could apply as to the explicitly misleading
content description).
122 Byron, supra note 63, at 10 (quoting Rogers 875 F.2d at 1007). “[I]f the titles ‘Nimmer on
Copyright’ and ‘Jane Fonda’s Workout Book’ were falsely applied to the underlying work there would
be liability under the Lanham Act. . . . [I]f either of these titles was used in connection with bogus
work, it would be copying a legally protected title.” Id.
123 Byron, supra note 63, at 12 (explaining that Rogers II is less protective of expression and more
effective at protecting against confusion).
124 Daniel Jacob Wright, Explicitly Explicit: The Rogers Test and the Ninth Circuit, 21 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 193, 204 (2013) (stating that the Rogers test is the appropriate method “to weigh the public
interest in free expression against the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion”); see also Cliff
Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Pub. Group, 886 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1989). In Cliff Notes,
Inc., defendant published books parodying Cliff Notes study aid series, which provided synopsis of
routinely read literary works. Cliff Notes sued under the Lanham Act for Defendant’s use of Cliff
Notes’ distinctive black and yellow trade dress. Cliff Notes argued the parody would confuse
consumers into thinking Cliff Notes published or endorsed Defendant’s book. The Second Circuit
stated the Rogers test “takes into account the ultimate test in trademark law, namely, the likelihood
of confusion as to the source of the goods.” Id. The court held that the Defendant’s usage of Cliff Notes’
black and white color scheme would only create “ . . . a slight risk of consumer confusion.” Id. at 497.
125 Twin Peaks Prods. v. Publ’n Int’l., Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379 (2d Cir. 1993). “The question then
is whether the title is misleading in that it induces . . . the public to believe the Book was prepared or
authorized by [the plaintiff]. However, the finding of likelihood of confusion must be particularly
compelling to outweigh the First Amendment interest recognized in Rogers.” Id.
126 Id. at 1379; Lombardo v. Dr. Suess Enters. L.P., 279 F. Supp. 3d 497, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)
(stating that Lombardo, author of Who’s Holiday [the “Play”], parodied How the Grinch Stole
Christmas! [“Grinch”] characters, plot, and setting. The Play constituted fair use and therefore did
not infringe defendant's copyright in Grinch or related trademarks).
127 Cliff Notes, Inc., 886 F.2d at 497.
128 Wright, supra note 124, at 206. “While the circuits have applied the Rogers test in different
and perhaps contradictory ways, the application of the text [sic] within the Ninth Circuit has proven
particularly confusing.” Id.
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Amendment protection and the property interests of the trademark holders. 129 This
balance turns on whether the product will cause consumer confusion. 130 However, it
appears that explicitly misleading and likelihood of confusion are synonymous under
this framework.131 In Mattel, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that the First Amendment
protected MCA’s usage of the term “Barbie” in their song “Barbie Girl.”132 However, in
doing so, the court first determined whether there was a likelihood of confusion before
analyzing whether the usage of the trademark was explicitly misleading.133
In Mattel, Inc., the Ninth Circuit adopted the Rogers test when the defendant
produced the song, “Barbie Girl,” which to Mattel’s dismay, entered Top 40 music
charts.134 In its application of the Rogers test, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the title
of the song was artistically relevant, thus satisfying the first prong of the Rogers test.135
As to the second Rogers test prong, the title “Barbie Girl” does not explicitly mislead
or suggest that Mattel was the creator of the song. 136 The Ninth Circuit went on to
state that they would “adopt the Rogers standard as our own.”137
In E.S.S. Entertainment 2000, the Ninth Circuit held the Play Pen being
modified into the “Pig Pen” was not explicitly misleading.138 The court was more
concerned with the artistic relevance of the Play Pen to the underlying video game. 139
The court evaluated whether Rock Star’s use was explicitly misleading in a manner
that would invoke the traditional likelihood of confusion test, though the court never
applied the traditional factors. The court determined that Rock Star’s use did not
present likelihood of confusion amongst consumers.140 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit
considered explicitly misleading and likelihood of confusion to be one in the same.141

129 Anthony Zangrillo, The Split on the Rogers v. Grimaldi Gridiron: An Analysis of Unauthorized
Trademark Use in Artistic Mediums, 27 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 385, 406 (2017).
130 Ford, supra note 66, at 319.
131 Id. at 320.
132 Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Rec., 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002). “Under the first prong of Rogers,
the use of Barbie in the song title clearly is relevant to the underlying work, namely, the. song itself.
As noted, the song is about Barbie and the values [Defendant] claims she represents.” Id.
133 Id. “The song title does not explicitly mislead as to the source of the work; it does not, explicitly,
or otherwise, suggest that it was product by Mattel.” Id.
134 Id. at 899.
135 Id. at 902 (stating that the song is about Barbie and the values Aqua believes her to hold, thus
making it relevant to the underlying work).
136 Id. “The only indication that Mattel might be associated with the song is the use of Barbie in
the title; if this were enough to satisfy this prong of the Rogers test, it would render Rogers a nullity.”
Id. (emphasis in original).
137 Mattel, Inc., 296 F.3d at 902.
138 E.S.S. Ent. 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2008).
139 Id. (quoting Mattel, Inc., 296 F.3d at 902) (“Under MCA Rec. and the cases that followed it,
only the use of a trademark with 'no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever' does not
merit First Amendment protection.”). Id.
140 Id. at 1100-01 (explaining there would be no likelihood of confusion because no reasonable
consumer would think (1) that E.S.S. had provided Rock Star with expertise or support in making the
game, (2) that E.S.S. had entered the video game industry, or (3) that Rock Star operated strip clubs).
141 E.S.S Ent. 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 444 F. Supp 2d 1012, 1049 (C.D. Cal 2006)
(indicating that “[t]he legal framework used to analyze an [explicitly misleading claim] is substantially
the same as the framework used to evaluate Lanham Act claims under federal law.”). Id.

[21:120:2022]

A Good Day to Be a Bad Spaniel

207

As a result, the court indirectly stated it would not interpret the Rogers test to diminish
the First Amendment defense.142
B. Placing VIP Products Within the Rogers Test Variations
Applying the Rogers test in VIP Products, the Ninth Circuit had no issues in
concluding that the Bad Spaniels Silly Squeaker was artistically relevant to Jack
Daniel’s Old No. 7 Black Label Whiskey.143 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit expanded
what constitutes a vehicle for expression by including a nontraditional form of artistic
expression.144 However, because VIP Products has stretched the application of the
Rogers test, it will be analyzed how this case falls within the three Rogers test
variations.
Under Rogers I, the relevant question is whether the use of the trademark was
explicitly or implicitly misleading.145 While the parodic underpinnings from the Jack
Daniel’s are relevant to the toy, were the parodic interpretations by the toy’s designer
done in an explicitly misleading manner? There is a tag affixed to the dog toy, explicitly
stating that the “product is not affiliated with Jack Daniel Distillery.” 146 Because of
this, it becomes evident that the dog toy, if misleading at all, it is misleading in only
an implicit manner.147 Accordingly, it constitutes a protected expressive work under
the First Amendment, thus falling outside the Lanham Act’s purview. 148
Is VIP Products a Rogers II case that requires VIP to demonstrate it can
overcome a heightened showing of confusion?149 The Ninth Circuit alluded to why
confusion was not likely by citing to previous Ninth Circuit cases while never explicitly
stating the dog toy would not confuse consumers.150 In its brief, VIP stated that there
was no evidence of confusion in the marketplace, despite Jack Daniel’s issuing a
142 E.S.S. Ent. 2000, Inc., 547 F.3d at 1099. “[A] trademark infringement claim presupposes a use
of the mark. If that necessary element in every trademark case vitiated a First Amendment defense,
the First Amendment would provide no defense at all.” Id.
143 VIP Prods. LLC v. Jack Daniel's Props., 953 F.3d 1170, 1175 (9th Cir. 2020). “The effect [of the
toy being an expressive work] is “a simple message” conveyed by juxtaposing the irreverent
representation of the of the trademark with the idealized image created by the mark’s owner.” Id.; see
also L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publrs. Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1987) (affording First Amendment
protection to a message “that business and product images need not always be taken too seriously.”).
Id.
144 VIP Prods. LLC, 953 F.3d at 1175 “The fact that VIP chose to convey this humorous message
through a dog toy is irrelevant.”; see Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos.,
515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995). “[T]he Constitution looks beyond written or spoken words as mediums of
expression.” Id.
145 Byron, supra note 63, at 10.
146 VIP Prods. LLC, 953 F.3d at 1172.
147 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1000 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating that a slight risk that the use
of a celebrity or popular business’ name might implicitly suggest endorsement is outweighed by the
danger of restricting artistic expression, and the Lanham Act will not be applicable).
148 Kramer, supra note 120, at 885. Had the Ninth Circuit taken this Rogers test approach, it is
likely that the court would have dismissed the claim since the dog toy would have fallen outside the
Lanham Act’s purview since the Ninth Circuit held that the likelihood of confusion test was not
appropriate in these circumstances.
149 Simon & Schuster v. Dove Audio, 936 F. Supp. 156, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (explaining that the
Lanham Act should be understood to apply to artistic works only when the public interest in avoiding
consumer confusion outweighs the public interest in free expression).
150 VIP Prods. LLC, 953 F.3d at 1175.
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survey.151 Moreover, Jack Daniel’s failed to present evidence that the dog toy market
was so saturated with Jack Daniel’s dog toys that it would not be able to create its own
version of a dog toy.152 Whilst VIP was able to demonstrate a lack of confusion, it is not
evident that, on its face, this case is a Rogers II case. Under the explicitly misleading
prong, Rogers II focuses less tolerant of public expression and shields the trademark
holders.153
It is evident that VIP Products is a Rogers III case for multiple reasons. First,
Rogers III arose out of the Ninth Circuit, the circuit that decided this case. Second, this
case aligns with the Ninth Circuit’s broad application of the Rogers test.154 Jack
Daniel’s was unable to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion or that the product was
explicitly misleading.155 Jack Daniel’s total absence of actual confusion amongst dog
toy purchasers was a strong indicator that Bad Spaniel’s created no likelihood of
confusion.156 In its ruling, the Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of VIP by assuring that any
such confusion did not outweigh VIP’s First Amendment protection.157 VIP Products
appears to be a Rogers III case due to a new artistic medium, here a dog toy, being
subject to the Rogers test.
C. There is No Likelihood of Confusion in VIP Products
While the Ninth Circuit declined to directly apply the likelihood of confusion
test,158 the result would have been the same had the test been applied. Multiple
likelihood of confusion factors will be analyzed to determine that there is no likelihood
of confusion between the dog toy and Jack Daniels Bottle.159
151 Brief for the Appellant at 43, VIP Prods. LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Props. Inc., 953 F.3d 1170 (No.
18-16012) (9th Cir. Nov. 9, 2018) (quoting Cohn v. PetSmart, Inc., 281 F.3d 837, 843 (9th Cir. 2002)).
Jack Daniels offered no evidence of actual confusion in the marketplace, which is a “powerful
indication” that such confusion unlikely. Id.
152 See generally Twin Peaks Prods. v. Publ’n Int’l., Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379 (2d Cir. 1993)
(holding that the defendant’s book competes in plaintiff’s markets).
153 Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding infringement
arising out of a deformed t-shirt version of the Mutual of Omaha Indian logo).
154 Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Rec., 296 F.3d 894, 901–02 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying the Rogers test to a
parodied song where the court held that the mere use of “Barbie” in the song title was not explicitly
misleading); see also Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mt. Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 796–97 (9th Cir. 2003)
(narrowing Mattel Inc.’s holding by requiring creators to utilize marks which have a cultural
significance).
155 VIP Prods. LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Props. Inc., 953 F.3d 1170, 1175 (9th Cir. 2020).
156 Brief for the Appellant at 42, VIP Prods. LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Props. Inc., 953 F.3d 1170 (No.
18-16012) (9th Cir. Nov. 9, 2018); see Yankee Publ’g, Inc. v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267,
275 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (explaining that an absence of evidence of confusion amongst the product’s
consumers strongly indicates there is no likelihood of confusion).
157 VIP Prods. LLC, 953 F.3d at 1175.
158 Id.; see also Mattel Inc., 296 F.3d at 900 (explaining that the likelihood of confusion test fails
to take into account the full extent of the public’s interest in free expression.); Byron, supra note 63,
at 16. “[T]he Ninth Circuit [has] stopped short of naming the likelihood of confusion factors test as its
analytical framework for determining misleading trademark uses.” Id.
159 AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979) stating:

In determining whether confusion between related goods is likely, the
following factors are relevant: 1. strength of the mark; 2. proximity of the goods; 3.
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First, one must analyze the strength of VIP’s mark. A trademark’s strength
covers two concepts: inherent distinctiveness and acquired distinctiveness.160 Bad
Spaniels invoked multiple elements of Jack Daniel’s Old. No. 7 whiskey bottle and
artistically altered the elements to convey its humorous message.161 For instance, “40%
Alc. by Vol.” was transformed into “43% POO BY VOL.” 162 Moreover, it does not matter
that VIP chose to utilize a famous whiskey bottle to convey its humorous message
because the “Constitution looks beyond written or spoken words as mediums of
expression”.163 Thus, VIP’s mark is distinctive from those of Jack Daniel’s.
Next, there is no proximity between the two products. 164 Comparing the two
products, it is evident they do not share a market. Jack Daniel’s only products are
spirits and mixed spirits.165 VIP’s only products on the market are their Silly
Squeakers.166 Moreover, the prices of the products are drastically different. A bottle of
Jack Daniel’s Old. No. 7 costs around $23167 while a Silly Squeaker costs around $12. 168
Because of this, there is not enough similarity between the products for this factor to
weigh in favor of the likelihood of consumer confusion.
Moreover, Jack Daniel’s would not prevail on the similarity of marks element.
Similarity of marks falls on three general principles. “[S]imilarity is best adjudged by
appearance, sound, and meaning.”169 VIP Products presents a stark similarity between
similarity of the marks; 4. evidence of actual confusion; 5. marketing channels used;
6. type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; 7.
defendant's intent in selecting the mark; and 8. likelihood of expansion of the
product lines.
160 Virgin Enters v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 2003) stating, “This inquiry [into inherent
distinctiveness] distinguishes between . . . inherently distinctive marks . . . and . . . that are generic,
descriptive or suggestive as to those goods. The former are strong marks.” Acquired distinctiveness
deals with “ . . . fame, or the extent to which prominent use of the mark in commerce has resulted in
a high degree of consumer recognition.” Id.
161 Brief for the Appellant at 23, VIP Prods. LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Props. Inc., 953 F.3d 1170 (No.
18-16012) (9th Cir. Nov. 9, 2018). “The concept was to borrow enough of the Jack Daniel’s mark and
bottle dress . . . to invoke the original and transform those borrowed elements into a humorous
comment on the original.” Id.
162 VIP Prods. LLC., 953 F.3d at 1172.
163 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995); see
also Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack Co. of Boca, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 232, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). “It is
unremarkable that [defendant] selected as a target of parody a readily recognizable product; indeed,
one would hardly make a spoof of an obscure or unknown product!” Id.
164 American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372, 382 (1926) (stating that the less likely
the public is to make such an association between the producers of related goods, the more similarity
in the marks is requisite to a finding of likelihood of confusion).
165 Jack Daniel’s, Our Products, JACK DANIEL’S https://www.jackdaniels.com/en-us/our-products
(last visited Oct. 11, 2021).
166 Brief for the Appellant at 1, VIP Prods. LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Props. Inc., 953 F.3d 1170 (No.
18-16012) (9th Cir. Nov. 9, 2018) (explaining that each Silly Squeaker is a parody of a famous beer,
wine, soda, or liquor bottle).
167 Binny’s,
Jack
Daniel’s
Old
No.
7
Tennessee
Whiskey,
BINNY’S,
https://www.binnys.com/spirits/whiskey/jack-daniels-old-no-tennessee-whiskey-191961 (last visited
Oct. 11, 2021).
168 Chewy, Silly Squeakers, CHEWY, https://www.chewy.com/f/silly-squeakers (last visited Oct. 11,
2021).
169 Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 1032 (9th
Cir. 2010) (quoting Entrepreneur Media v. Smith, 279 F.3d 1135, 1144 (9th Cir. 2002)).
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appearances as the dog toy contains multiple parodic play on words based on the
infamous Jack Daniel’s bottle.170 An argument could even be made that the sounds of
the products are different as the dog toy makes squeaking noises 171 while the Jack
Daniel’s would make a “clinking” noise as it is made of glass.172 Lastly, the two products
carry two different meanings with them as the dog toy makes for a fun night with
fido173 and Jack Daniel’s makes for a fun night with friends.174
Lastly, there is no evidence of bad faith on part of VIP.175 VIP stated the intent
of producing the Silly Squeakers toy line was to “develop a creative parody on existing
products.”176 Additionally, VIP aimed at conveying a message that poked fun at famous
brands that take themselves too seriously.177 In doing so, VIP reminds us that “we are
free to laugh at the images and associations linked with the mark.” 178 The benefits VIP
derives from the parody arise from the widely regarded whiskey and the amusing dog
toy, not from customer confusion.179 Because of this, there is no evidence that VIP was
acting in bad faith when creating the Bad Spaniels toy.
In conclusion, it is evident the aforementioned likelihood of confusion factors
weigh in VIP’s favor. The strength of their mark is sufficient to set them apart from
Jack Daniel’s so as not to cause consumer confusion.
D. Applications to Prayer Candles as Being Protected Under the Rogers Test
In holding that a dog toy is an expressive work,180 the Ninth Circuit has
dramatically expanded what constitutes an expressive work for the Rogers test. The
court’s decision concerning the application of the Rogers test and First Amendment
protections can be paralleled to other non-traditional expressive works, such as prayercandles.181 The Ninth Circuit stated that a product does not have to be “equivalent to

170 VIP Prods. LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Props. Inc., 953 F.3d 1170, 1172 (9th Cir. 2020). Notable
differences include “the Old No. 2, on your Tennessee Carpet” as opposed to “Old No. 7 Brand
Tennessee Sour Mash Whiskey,” and “43% POO BY VOL.,” and “100% SMELLY” replace the infamous
bottle’s label of “40% Alc. by Vol. (80 Proof).” Id.
171 Mydogtoy.com, supra note 6. The website describes the toys as “fun squeaky toys.” Id.
172 Binny’s, supra note 167.
173 Mydogtoy.com, supra note 6. The website states “your dog's favorite toys, and yours too!” Id.
174 Jack Daniel’s, supra note 167. “Please drink responsibly.” Id.
175 AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 354 (9th Cir. 1979); Fleischmann Distilling Corp.
v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149, 157–58 (9th Cir. 1963) (stating that when the alleged infringer
knowingly adopts a mark similar to another's, reviewing courts presume that the defendant can
accomplish his purpose: that is, that the public will be deceived).
176 Brief for the Appellant at 10, VIP Prods. LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Props. Inc., 953 F.3d 1170 (No.
18-16012) (9th Cir. Nov. 9, 2018). The parodic nature can be confirmed when a VIP designer received
a phone call from VIP’s president in which he said only “Bad Spaniel’s. You figure it out.” Id.
177 Id. at 21 (explaining that VIP aims to send the message that it is okay to make fun of wellknown brands).
178 Id.
179 See generally Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog LLC, 464 F. Supp. 2d, 495,
502 (E.D. Va. 2006). The benefit of making a parody arises from humorous association, not from public
confusion. Id.
180 VIP Prods. LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Props. Inc., 953 F.3d 1170, 1175 (9th Cir. 2020).
181 Amazon,
Saint
Harry
Styles:
Masculinity
in
Femininity,
AMAZON,
https://www.amazon.com/Saint-Harry-Styles-Masculinity-Femininity (last visited Oct. 11, 2021). The
product description states that it is a “novelty” candle. Id.
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the Mona Lisa” to be considered an expressive work.182 Moreover, an expressive work
can be communicated in different manners.183 Accordingly, the standard to qualify as
an expressive work is quite low. This analysis will follow that of Rogers I as the
standard for what constitutes an expressive work is highest under this variation.
1. The Parody Prayer Candle is Artistically Relevant to the Underlying Work
A traditional prayer candle typically depicts an image of Jesus, Mary, or a
saint.184 The image on the traditional prayer candle image tends to look like it was
either drawn or painted onto the candle and is framed around stained glass.185
Furthermore, the name of the individual depicted is on the candle. 186 The medium
through which the work is expressed does not matter when it pertains to a work being
expressive, so long as it is artistically relevant.187
However, while the parodic interpretation of prayer candles follows the same
artistic format as a prayer candle, there are key differences that make it artistically
relevant. The parodic candles tend to be bright in color and look like a photograph
affixed on the candle. 188 Similar to a traditional candle, parodic candles tend to have
the celebrity’s name placed on the candle.189 Despite these similarities, it would be
evident that the celebrity depicted on the candle did not endorse the candle.
At a quick glance, an individual should be able to establish that one candle is
religious whilst the other depicts a pop culture icon. It is these key distinctions that
set parodic candles apart from the traditional prayer candles. Because the level of
relevance must only be above zero, the parodic candles would qualify under this prong
of the Rogers test.190 Moreover, because the parodic candles utilize the themes of the
religious candles, they are artistically relevant.191
VIP Prods. LLC, 953 F.3d at 1175.
Punchbowl, Inc. v. AJ Press LLC, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146052, at *19 (C.D. Cal. July 16,
2021). “For example, each of the defendants in Dr. Seuss, E.S.S., Mattel, and Twentieth-Century Fox
could have chosen a different title or used a different word.” Id.
184 Target, Jar Candle Sagrado Corazon De Jesus White Vanilla - Continental Candle, TARGET,
https://www.target.com/p/jar-candle-sagrado-corazon-de-jesus-white-vanilla-continental-candle- (last
visited Oct. 11, 2021).
185 Amazon, Prayer Glass Candle Yellow - Jesus, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/GlassCandle-Yellow-Jesus- (last visited Oct. 11, 2021).
186 Target,
Jar
Candle
San
Miguel
Red
Continental
Candle,
TARGET,
https://www.target.com/p/jar-candle-san-miguel-red-continental-candle (last visited Oct. 11, 2021).
187 Kramer, supra note 120, at 877 (“[H]olding that use of a mark is ‘artistically relevant’ when
the mark relates to defendants’ work and defendants add their own artistic expression beyond that of
the mark.”).
188 Etsy, Cardi B Prayer Candle, ITSLITBYE, https://www.etsy.com/listing/585831947/cardi-bprayer-candle (last visited Oct. 11, 2021). The candle depicts Cardi B, a well-known singer, who is
holding a bottle of Bacardi Rum and states “Saint Bardi”. Id.
189 Amazon, Timothee Chalamet Celebrity Prayer Candle - Funny Saint Candle, AMAZON,
https://www.amazon.com/Timothee-Chalamet-Celebrity-Prayer-Candle (last visited Oct. 11, 2021).
The candle depicts Timothee Chalamet, a well-known French actor, additionally the title of the candle
says, “Funny Celeb Novelty Actor TV Show Movie Gift.” Id.
190 E.S.S. Ent. 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2008).
191 Twentieth Century Fox TV v. Empire Distrib., Inc., 875 F.3d 1192, 1199 (9th Cir. 2017)
(explaining that a product may have artistic relevance by supporting the themes of another work.
However, while reference to another work may be a component of artistic relevance, it is not a
prerequisite).
182
183
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2. The Parody Prayer Candle Does Not Explicitly Mislead Consumers as to the Source
or Content of the Work
To fail the second prong of the Rogers test in the Ninth Circuit, “the creator
must explicitly mislead consumers.”192 On its face, it is not evident that consumer
confusion as to celebrity endorsement of the candle is likely for multiple reasons.
Where the candles can be purchased should allude to a lack of confusion. The
traditional prayer candles are typically purchased at grocery stores and online
vendors.193 On the other hand, the parodic candles are normally found exclusively
through online vendors.194 Had the parodic candles been endorsed by celebrities, they
would likely be found online on their own websites, not an online vendor selling a
multitude of celebrity candles.195
Lastly, and most notable, the names of the candles should be a strong indicator
that consumer confusion is not likely. The traditional prayer candles have the name of
the religious figure in them or explicitly say prayer candle. 196 For example, a candle
depicting the image of Archangel San Miguel contains San Miguel” in the candle’s title,
clearly indicating the candle’s religious connotations.
Had celebrities endorsed these candles, the name of the celebrity, or their
brand, would likely appear in the title or description of the product. This is a practice
commonly seen in a variety of industries.197 For example, Beyonce’s collaboration with
Adidas is entitled “Adidas x Ivy Park.”198 However, the parodic candles clearly depict
a pop culture icon or contain words in the title alluding to it being a parody. To
illustrate, the words “celebrity,” “novelty,” and “funny” appear in the title of a candle
portraying Timothee Chalamet.199
These key distinctions between the candles indicate that the parodic candle
creators do not explicitly mislead consumers to make them believe the candles to be
celebrity endorsed.200 Moreover, the usage of a mark is not enough to satisfy the second
prong of the Rogers test.201 However, perhaps these parodic candles are merely “living
on a prayer” until a lawsuit by a celebrity is brought forth against them.202
Id.
Target, supra note 184; Amazon, supra note 185.
194 Etsy, supra note 188; Amazon, supra note 185.
195 Billie Eilish, Apparel, BILLIE EILISH, www.store.billieeilish.com (last visited Mar. 14, 2022).
196 Target, supra note 184. The name of the candle, “San Miguel,” matches the San Miguel
Archangel depicted on the candle. Id.; Amazon, supra note 185. The candle name states it is a prayer
candle with “Jesus,” matching the image of Jesus on the candle. Id.
197 See Morphe, Morphe x Maddie Ziegler, MORPHE, https://eu.morphe.com/collections/morphe-xmaddie-ziegler (last visited Mar. 16, 2022) (showing a makeup collaboration between makeup brand,
Morphe, and famous dancer, Maddie Ziegler); CB2, Kravitz Design by Lenny Kravitz, CB2,
https://www.cb2.com/design-collabs/kravitz/1 (last visited Mar. 16, 2022) (showing a look book and
shop for a furniture collaboration between home goods store, CB2, and famous musician, Lenny
Kravitz).
198 Adidas, Adidas x Ivy Park, ADIDAS, www.adidad.com/us/ivypark (last visited Mar 15, 2022)
(showing Ivy Park as Beyonce’s fashion line).
199 Amazon, supra note 189. Additional words alluding to the candle being a parody include “pop
culture” and “funny celeb novelty.” Id.
200 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1001 (2d Cir. 1989).
201 Id.
202 BON JOVI, LIVIN’ ON A PRAYER (Mercury Records 1986).
192
193
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CONCLUSION

Following the formation of the Rogers test in 1989, circuit courts have
struggled to find a balance between First Amendment rights regarding artistic
expression with the rights of the trademark owner to avoid consumer confusion. Out
of this struggle came three prevalent Rogers tests variations, each with their own
varying degree of First Amendment protection.203 These three drastically different
variations of the Rogers test needlessly complicate the law which is reflected in the
inconsistent holdings across the circuits.204
The Ninth Circuit’s inconsistent application of the Rogers test reflects the
capricious nature of trademarks in modern society. Trademarks have developed
beyond their role as “source indicators to take on greater cultural significance.” 205
Rogers, MCA Records, Walking Mountain, and most recently VIP Products,
demonstrate how the First Amendment can broadly protect cultural references,
criticisms, and parody.206 While a dog toy may not be a traditional form of artistic
expression, VIP Products serves to broaden what constitutes an expressive work, and
more importantly, what expressive works can be protected under the First
Amendment.207
A decision out of the Ninth Circuit clarifying its position and application of the
Rogers test will have an immense impact on the nature of artistic expression available
to the public.208 However, VIP Products falls short of being the Ninth Circuit case
providing such clarity. VIP Products will likely form another “fault line in the circuit
split” regarding the application of the Rogers test to expressive works.209

203 Ford, supra note 66, at 310 (stating that Rogers I offers the most First Amendment protection
to media defendants from Lanham Act claims); Cliff Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Pub. Group,
886 F.2d 490, 493 (2d Cir. 1989) (considering initially that the traditional likelihood of confusion
factors before balancing consumer confusion with the First Amendment); E.S.S. Ent. 2000, Inc. v.
Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating what counts as misleading as
synonymous to what is likely to cause confusion).
204 Ford, supra note 66, at 307.
205 Wright, supra note 124, at 221.
206 Brief for the Appellant at 29, VIP Prods. LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Props. Inc., 953 F.3d 1170 (No.
18-16012) (9th Cir. Nov. 9, 2018) (treating VIP’s parody of the Jack Daniel’s bottle as artistically
relevant and not explicitly misleading as to its source, offers the toy First Amendment protection).
207 VIP Prods. LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Props. Inc., 953 F.3d 1170, 1175 (9th Cir. 2020) (explaining
that the Bad Spaniel’s toy conveys a simple message through the juxtaposition of the “irreverent
representation” of Jack Daniel’s marks with the idealized image created by VIP); see also L.L. Bean,
Inc. v. Drake Publrs. Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that Drake Publisher’s adult erotic
periodical parodying an L.L. Bean catalog featuring models using L.L. Bean products crudely and
humorously was used in an unauthorized negative context, but it was protected because it was used
for non-commercial purposes).
208 Wright, supra note 124, at 222. If the Ninth Circuit were to issue a clarifying decision, it may
help guide future courts in their struggle to balance free speech against trademark protection. Id.
209 Thomas Key, The Bad Spaniel’s Gets a Treat: VIP Products LLC v. Jack Daniels Properties
Inc., THE IP KAT (May 7, 2020), https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2020/05/the-bad-spaniel-gets-treat-vipproducts.
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Some may say that the court’s holding was unprecedented and may place
brand owners at substantial risk of infringement masquerading as expressive works.210
It is evident that what makes a title or creative aspect “artistically relevant” and
“explicitly misleading” is undoubtedly evolving as time progresses.211 With this, comes
a game of tug of war for the Rogers test between encouraging and stifling economic
activity to protect major brands and encouraging artistic expression in the form of
expression.

210 Jared Kagan, Bad Spaniels Make Bad Law: Ninth Circuit Says Dog Toy is an Expressive Work
Entitled
to
First
Amendment
Protection,
IP
WATCH
DOG
(Apr.
3,
2020),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/04/03/bad-spaniels-make-bad-law.
211 Kelly, supra note 14, at 1365.

